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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The present case arises essentially as an appeal by the 
plaintiffs Ronald and Faye Alexander ("the Alexanders") and 
the Fair Housing Partnership of Greater Pittsburgh, Inc. 
("the FHP") from a judgment entered in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.1 The 
Alexanders and the FHP brought suit against Joseph and 
Maria Riga ("the Rigas"), the owners of the building in the 
Squirrel Hill neighborhood of Pittsburgh in which the 
Alexanders sought to rent an apartment. In their suit, the 
Alexanders and the FHP alleged racial discrimination in the 
rental of housing pursuant to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 
as amended, 42 U.S.C. S3601 et seq., and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. SS1981 and 1982. In 
their complaint, the Alexanders and the FHP sought 
damages, as well as equitable and injunctive relief. 
 Following an eight-day trial in the District Court, the jury 
found, on special verdicts, that Mrs. Riga had violated the 
Fair Housing Act when she denied rental housing to the 
Alexanders based upon race. Nonetheless, the jury found 
Mrs. Riga's conduct was not "a legal cause of harm" to the 
Alexanders and did not award damages. The jury found 
that Mrs. Riga's conduct was "a legal cause of harm" to the 
FHP, but, likewise, did not award damages. Thus, the 
District Court declined to submit to the jury the issue of 
punitive damages, which had been bifurcated from the 
liability portion of the case. Following post-trial motions, 
the District Court entered judgment in favor of the Rigas 
(the defendants) and the FHP, and against the Alexanders, 
and directed the parties to bear their own costs. 
 
On appeal, the Alexanders (the plaintiffs), supported by 
the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund and the 
United States Department of Justice as amici curiae, raise 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Rigas, in a cross-appeal, assert that the District Court erred in 
denying them summary judgment, in excluding evidence, and in denying 
them costs. 
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a host of issues related principally to the jury instructions 
and the conduct of the trial. We have jurisdiction to review 
the District Court's final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 
Because we find that in a case alleging discrimination 
under the Fair Housing Act the discrimination itself is the 
harm, we will reverse the decision of the District Court 
granting judgment to the Rigas as against the Alexanders 
and the decision declining to submit the question of 
punitive damages to the jury. We will direct the District 
Court on remand to enter judgment for the Alexanders and 
to hold a new trial to present to a jury the question of 
punitive damages, as against both Mr. and Mrs. Riga. 
 
I. 
 
From September 17, 1995, through October 8, 1995, on 
ten separate occasions, Ronald and/or Faye Alexander, an 
African-American couple, inquired about an apartment at 
5839 Darlington Road, Squirrel Hill, which had been 
advertised in a September 17 newspaper. Joseph and Maria 
Riga owned the building, which Mrs. Riga managed. Mrs. 
Riga falsely told the Alexanders that the apartment was 
unavailable and the Alexanders were denied a view. Their 
phone calls to inquire about the apartment were not 
returned. Daria Mitchell, an African-American "tester" for 
the FHP, was falsely told that the apartment had been 
rented, and thereafter, Mrs. Riga refused to return 
Mitchell's calls. 
 
In contrast, from September 18 through October 9, 1995, 
on ten separate occasions, Mrs. Riga truthfully told Dennis 
Orvosh, a white tester for the FHP, and whites Robin 
McDonough, Jeff Lang, and Heidi Sestrich, that the 
apartment was available, allowed each a view, and returned 
their phone calls. 
 
On January 11, 1996, the Alexanders and the FHPfiled 
this civil action against the Rigas. In their complaint, the 
plaintiffs sought damages, as well as equitable and 
injunctive relief, for alleged race discrimination. Specifically, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the Rigas discriminated against 
the individual plaintiffs on the basis of their race in 
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violation of the Fair Housing Act in connection with the 
attempts of Mr. and Mrs. Alexander to view a rental 
property owned by the Rigas in Squirrel Hill. The Fair 
Housing Act prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of 
housing, including the refusal to negotiate for the rental of, 
or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any 
person because of race; to discriminate against any person 
in the terms, conditions or privileges of rental of a dwelling 
because of race; or to represent to any person because of 
race that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale 
or rental when such dwelling is, in fact, available. See 42 
U.S.C. SS 3604(a), (b) and (d). The plaintiffs sought 
equitable relief including an order requiring the posting of 
fair housing notices and a cease and desist order 
prohibiting the Rigas from discriminating on the basis of 
race. 
 
Following an eight-day trial in May, 1998, a jury returned 
eight special verdicts. The jury found that Mrs. Riga had 
discriminated against the Alexanders in violation of the Fair 
Housing Act. Nonetheless, the jury found that the 
discriminatory conduct of Mrs. Riga was not "a legal cause 
of harm" to either Mr. or Mrs. Alexander, and declined to 
award them monetary damages.2 As to the FHP, the jury 
found that the discriminatory conduct of Mrs. Riga was "a 
legal cause of harm" to the FHP, however, here, too, the 
jury declined to award monetary damages. The issue of 
punitive damages had been bifurcated from the issues of 
liability and compensatory and/or nominal damages. After 
the return of the jury's special verdicts, the court declined 
to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Based 
on the special verdicts, the District Court entered judgment 
in favor of the Rigas and against the plaintiffs, together 
with costs, on May 26, 1988. 
 
On May 28, 1998, the plaintiffs filed four post-trial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although both Mr. and Mrs. Riga were defendants at trial, the special 
verdicts that were submitted to the jury were limited to determining Mrs. 
Riga's liability for discriminatory conduct. The District Court concluded, 
mistakenly, as discussed infra, that only Mrs. Riga was involved in the 
events leading to this lawsuit because Mr. Riga was in Italy at all 
relevant times. 
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motions: (1) to enter a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, to issue an additur of nominal damages in the 
amount of one dollar for each plaintiff, or to grant a new 
trial on damages, or in the alternative, award punitive 
damages as a matter of law against both Mr. and Mrs. Riga; 
(2) for a hearing on injunctive relief; (3) for attorney's fees, 
costs and expenses; and (4) to grant the plaintiffs judgment 
as a matter of law. The Rigas moved to tax costs against 
the plaintiffs. 
 
On October 13, 1998, the District Court denied the 
plaintiffs' motions except for the FHP's motion to have 
judgment entered in its favor, denied the Rigas' motion to 
tax costs, and entered judgment. The plaintiffsfiled a 
timely notice of appeal on November 5, 1998. The Rigas 
also filed a timely cross-appeal. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs put forth several major 
contentions. They assert that the District Court should 
have entered judgment for them because the jury charges 
presented an incorrect legal standard with respect to 
liability. The plaintiffs further maintain that the District 
Court presented an incorrect legal standard with respect to 
nominal damages and erred in refusing to submit the issue 
of punitive damages to the jury after the jury found that 
Mrs. Riga had discriminated on the basis of race in 
violation of the Fair Housing Act but awarded neither 
compensatory nor nominal damages. The plaintiffs argue, 
too, that both Mr. and Mrs. Riga should be subjected to 
punitive damages, because, although Mr. Riga was out of 
the country at this time, he violated a nondelegable duty 
not to discriminate under the Fair Housing Act. 
 
II. 
 
The Fair Housing Act was intended by Congress to have 
"broad remedial intent." Havens Realty v. Coleman, 455 
U.S. 363, 380 (1982). As this case stands after trial, the net 
result of the plaintiffs' victory was that they were out-of- 
pocket for the expenses of litigation. Historically, 
enforcement of the civil rights statutes depends, in large 
measure, on the willingness of private plaintiffs to pursue 
individual cases. The Supreme Court has attached 
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importance to each individual's prosecution of 
discrimination under the statutes: 
 
       the objectives of the [discrimination statutes] are 
       furthered when even a single [individual] establishes 
       that [another individual] has discriminated against him 
       or her. The disclosure through litigation of incidents 
       and practices that violate national policies respecting 
       nondiscrimination . . . is itself important. 
 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub., 513 U.S. 352, 358 - 59 
(1992). And, with respect to the Fair Housing Act in 
particular, the Supreme Court has held that 
 
       since the enormity of the task of assuring fair housing 
       makes the role of the [United States] Attorney General 
       in the matter minimal, the main generating force must 
       be private suits in which . . . the complainants act not 
       only on their own behalf but also "as private attorneys 
       general in vindicating a policy that Congress 
       considered to be of the highest priority." 
 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 211 
(1972). 
 
III. 
 
A. The Alleged Errors in the Jury Instructions 
 
The Alexanders argue on appeal that, after the jury's 
verdict that the Fair Housing Act was violated, the District 
Court was required to enter judgment in favor of them and 
the FHP.3 All plaintiffs allege on appeal primarily two flaws 
in the District Court's jury instructions. The plaintiffs 
specifically argue that the District Court erred: (1) in 
requiring that the jury find "legal causation" for "harm" as 
a prerequisite to finding liability under the Fair Housing 
Act, and (2) in requiring that the jury find "insubstantial" 
actual damages or "legal harm" as a prerequisite to 
awarding nominal damages. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Ultimately, the District Court did grant judgment in the FHP's favor, 
but did not award any damages. 
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Unfortunately, a party who has not challenged the trial 
court's jury instructions at an appropriate time is deemed 
to have waived such a challenge. We have emphasized the 
need to raise any objections to jury instructions prior to the 
time the jury begins its deliberations: 
 
        Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 51, a party, in order to preserve 
       an objection either to a failure to instruct the jury on 
       an issue or to the manner in which the jury was 
       instructed, clearly must "object[ ] thereto before the 
       jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the 
       matter objected to and the grounds of the objection." 
       See also, McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 896 F.2d 
       750, 759 (3d Cir. 1990) (declining to consider newly 
       developed argument concerning jury charge deficiency 
       where party "failed to specifically and clearly object to 
       either the charge or the entry of a judgment . . . based 
       on this charge"); Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723, 739- 
       40 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that objection, because 
       sufficiently specific, had preserved error alleged on 
       appeal). 
 
Simmons v. Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1078 (3d Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985 (1992). Generally, a party 
who does not clearly and specifically object to a charge he 
believes to be erroneous waives the issue on appeal. Id. 
 
If the party claiming error in the jury instructions did not 
make a timely objection, we review for plain error and we 
will reverse only if the trial court committed plain error that 
was fundamental and highly prejudicial, such that the 
instructions failed to provide the jury with adequate 
guidance, and the District Court's refusal to consider the 
issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. Cooper 
Distrib'g v. Amana Refrig.,180 F.3d 542, 549 - 550 (3d Cir. 
1999). Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. We have characterized plain error 
review in the absence of a "timely and specific objection," as 
"a form of discretionary review that we have exercised 
sparingly . . . ." Id., see also Bowley v. Stotler, 751 F.2d 
641, 652 (3d Cir. 1985); see also United States v. 564.54 
Acres of Land, 576 F.2d 983, 987 (3d Cir. 1978) (under 
plain error doctrine, court may review jury instruction if 
error is "fundamental and highly prejudicial" and failure to 
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consider it "would result in a miscarriage of justice"), rev'd 
on other grounds, 441 U.S. 506 (1979). 
 
In short, our discretion to conduct a review under the 
plain error doctrine is limited to cases where the error is (1) 
fundamental and highly prejudicial or if the instructions 
are such that the jury is without adequate guidance on a 
fundamental question and (2) our failure to consider the 
error would result in a miscarriage of justice. 564.54 Acres 
of Land at 576 F.2d at 987 - 988. Consistent with our belief 
that this discretionary power should be exercised sparingly, 
we will review the purported deficiencies in the jury 
instructions to determine whether they have been properly 
preserved and constitute grounds either for reversing the 
District Court's decision or for a new trial. The issue of 
whether a jury instruction misstates the proper legal 
standard is subject to plenary review. Hopp v. Pittsburgh, 
194 F.3d 434, 440 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
1. The Alleged Error on Liability 
 
The plaintiffs assert that the District Court's liability 
instruction was inaccurate and misleading and might have 
caused the jury not to award any damages despite their 
finding of a Fair Housing Act violation. Though the jury 
found that Mrs. Riga had discriminated against the 
Alexanders, the jury found that there was no liability. The 
Alexanders did not receive a liability verdict because they 
were unable to prove "causation." On the other hand, the 
FHP did receive a liability verdict; the jury found that there 
was "legal cause" as to the FHP caused by Mrs. Riga's 
discriminatory acts. 
 
This is a statutory form of action. The Fair Housing Act 
provides that "[a]n aggrieved person may commence a civil 
action in an appropriate United States district court or 
State court not later than 2 years after the occurrence or 
the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing 
practice . . . to obtain appropriate relief with respect to 
such discriminatory housing practice or breach."4 42 U.S.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The FHP, a fair housing organization, is an "aggrieved person" under 
the statute and is entitled to obtain relief, including punitive damages. 
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S3613(a)(1)(a). The Fair Housing Act defines"discriminatory 
housing practice," in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
        (a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making  of a 
       bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or 
       rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a 
       dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, 
       sex, familial status, or national origin. 
 
*** 
         (d) To represent to any person because of race, color, 
       religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national 
       origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, 
       sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so 
       available. 
 
42 U.S.C. S3604.5 The plain language of the Fair Housing 
Act thus permits an individual to obtain relief for the 
discriminatory housing practice or breach. A prospective 
tenant must prove only that a landlord did one of the 
unlawful acts listed in section 3604 with respect to the 
prospective tenant's attempt to obtain housing. If an 
individual proves discrimination, he or she need not prove 
anything else. The District Court imposed upon the statute 
another requirement, "legal causation." The Rigas argue 
that the discrimination is the "legal cause" for the "harm," 
which itself must be proved. To the contrary, the"harm" is 
the discrimination. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
See Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 379 (1982); See also Growth Horizons v. 
Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (3rd Cir. 1993); See also 
Hope, Inc. v. DuPage County, 717 F.2d 1061, 1074 (7th Cir. 1983). On 
appeal, the Rigas have challenged the FHP's standing in this case. We 
note that the Supreme Court has held that a fair housing organization 
had standing to sue if the discriminatory acts impaired the 
organization's ability to carry out its mission. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. 
at 
 
378 - 379. Here, the FHP staff "stopped everything else" and devoted all 
attention to this case. It, moreover, diverted resources to investigate 
and 
 
to counter the Rigas' conduct. 
 
5. In conjunction with the Fair Housing Act "Definitions" at 42 U.S.C. 
S3602. 
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The Alexanders felt themselves to be the victims of 
housing discrimination and sued the Rigas under the Fair 
Housing Act, both to vindicate their unlawful treatment and 
the public interest in fair housing. One "unlawful act" of 
several which falls under the ambit of section 3604 is that 
the Alexanders were told that the apartment was not 
available, when it was. The statute directly focuses on that 
situation, seeks to deter it, and seeks to remedy it. At trial, 
the Alexanders related what transpired during their 
housing search and also described additional adverse 
consequences, such as emotional distress, for which they 
sought compensatory damages. Although the jury declined 
to award compensatory damages for any adverse 
consequences flowing from the discrimination, the jury 
believed that the Alexanders were indeed victims of illegal 
discrimination. 
 
We conclude that the District Court misstated the proper 
legal standard in this Fair Housing Act case by requiring 
"legal causation" beyond a showing of illegal discrimination. 
Nonetheless, we find that the plaintiffs did not make a 
timely objection to the jury charge on this issue and have 
so waived it. The plaintiffs did not object to this 
requirement of "legal causation" at the close of the jury 
instructions. Moreover, the attorneys for both plaintiffs had 
previously participated in a charge conference in which 
they met with the judge and agreed upon instructions. 
 
Under a plain error analysis, unquestionably, the 
instructions requiring "legal causation" failed to provide the 
jury with adequate guidance as to compensatory damages.6 
See Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256, 
265(7th Cir. 1997)(instruction "confusing" where jury 
charged that one element of a Fair Housing Act violation is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Rigas urge that our holding in Gunby v. Pennsylvania Elec., 840 
F.2d 1108, 1121 - 1122 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989) 
mandates that, to determine liability in a Fair Housing Act case, a jury 
find "causation" linked to "actual injury." Gunby is inapplicable here. In 
Gunby, the plaintiff did not present evidence that he suffered any 
emotional distress as a result of the loss of the sought-after job. Thus, 
we set aside the jury's award of compensatory damages for emotional 
distress, holding that emotional distress cannot be presumed and that 
speculative damages are not to be awarded. 
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proof that the discriminatory housing practice caused 
"actual injury"), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1251 (1997). The 
second criterion for plain error, however, is that our refusal 
to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
The plaintiffs have conceded that they did not make a 
claim for substantial compensatory damages. Further, we 
cannot say, in light of our decision taken as a whole, which 
should afford substantial relief to the plaintiffs, see B. The 
Assignment of Judgment, infra, that our refusal to consider 
the issue of compensatory damages would result in a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
2. The Alleged Error on Nominal Damages 
 
The plaintiffs further argue that the jury was improperly 
instructed and that the jury committed error when it failed 
to return an award of $1 in nominal damages for Mrs. 
Riga's violation of the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiffs allege 
that the District Court erred in instructing the jury that an 
award of nominal damages requires a finding of 
"insubstantial" actual damages, or of "legal harm."7 Rather, 
the plaintiffs contend that nominal damages should be 
awarded where the jury has found a federal civil rights 
violation, particularly the "fundamental" right to fair 
housing. Thus, the jury should have been instructed that it 
was required to find nominal damages if it found, as it did, 
that housing discrimination had occurred and the jury 
should have acted in conformity with that instruction and 
awarded the plaintiffs these damages. 
 
The District Court apparently felt that this case involved 
"merely" a violation of "purely statutory rights," and that, 
therefore, nominal damages were not required. In our 
opinion, this stance trivializes the role of civil rights law in 
eradicating discrimination. Racial discrimination, according 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Notably, plaintiffs did object after the jury charge to the District 
Court's special verdict questions charging that the jury find "legal harm" 
and "legal cause" and proposed that the special verdict ask only whether 
"harm" was caused. The District Court refused, stating, ". . . My 
instructions are clear." 
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to the Supreme Court, is a "fundamental injury to the 
individual rights of a person," Goodman v. Lukens Steel, 
482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987), and the inability to buy or lease 
real property can be considered one of the badges and 
incidents of slavery. See also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3, 22 - 23 (1883). Indeed, even absent proof of actual 
injury, nominal damages are to be awarded to recognize 
violation of a constitutional right. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 
247, 266 -67 (1978). 
 
This entitlement is not automatic, however, "but rather, 
it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to make a timely request 
for nominal damages." Campos-Orrego v. Rivera , 175 F.3d 
89 (1st Cir. 1999). In this instance, the plaintiffs requested 
and received an instruction on nominal damages, but failed 
to bring to the District Court's attention their contention 
that the jury should have been instructed that nominal 
damages are mandatory with a finding of discrimination. 
The plaintiffs neglected to bring this matter to the attention 
of the trial judge prior to the time the jury retired to 
consider its verdict, much less the specific grounds upon 
which it was based. In an attempt to avoid a holding that 
this failure to object to the jury instructions waived their 
right to challenge the jury's nominal damages verdict on 
appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the District Court's failure 
here was plain error. 
 
Without deciding the question, we find that even if the 
jury were without adequate guidance on the question of 
whether nominal damages are mandatory or discretionary 
for violation of a federal statute, failure to rectify this error 
under the specific circumstances of this case does not 
result in a miscarriage of justice. In the final analysis, given 
our holding in this case, the plaintiffs are the prevailing 
parties, have the opportunity to recover punitive damages, 
and might each only receive $1 less in compensation than 
that to which it might be entitled. See 564.4 Acres of Land, 
576 F.2d at 988 (failure to rectify error could result in 
miscarriage of justice because one party could receive 
several million dollars less in compensation than that to 
which it was entitled). Thus, we hold that the plaintiffs' 
failure to challenge the jury instruction dealing with 
nominal damages waived their right to raise this question 
on appeal. 
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B. The Assignment of Judgment 
 
On a crucial and related matter, we find that because the 
jury found that the Fair Housing Act was violated, the 
District Court was required, as a matter of law, to enter 
judgment for both the Alexanders and the FHP. The District 
Court's refusal to enter judgment for the Alexanders 
constitutes an abuse of discretion, and we will reverse.8 
Similarly, the District Court abused its discretion in failing 
to find that both the Alexanders and the FHP were 
"prevailing parties" and entitled to costs under 42 U.S.C. 
S 3613(c)(2). See New Jersey Coalition of Rooming & 
Boarding House Owners v. Mayor of Asbury Park, 152 F.3d 
217, 225 (3d Cir. 1998)(the Fair Housing Act's costs 
"provision, which sounds fully discretionary. . .--`the court, 
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a 
reasonable attorney's fee and costs'--actually is not. In fact, 
a district court's discretion not to grant attorney's fees and 
costs in civil rights cases is tightly cabined.") We therefore 
hold that both the Alexanders and the FHP were prevailing 
parties and will direct the District Court to award them 
attorneys' fees and costs on remand. 
 
C. Punitive Damages 
 
1. Conduct Calling for Punitive Damages 
 
In this case, the District Court declined to send the issue 
of punitive damages to the jury. One main reason for this 
appears to have been that because the jury awarded no 
actual damages to either plaintiff, the District Court 
concluded that Mrs. Riga was not liable to the Alexanders. 
Because so much of the Rigas' brief was devoted to this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Without deciding the waiver issue as to declaratory relief for the 
Alexanders, on this one point regarding final judgment, we are satisfied 
that even were there a waiver, the matter would be one of plain error. 
Entering judgment for the party found by the jury to have violated the 
Fair Housing Act, rather than for the victims who had been 
discriminated against, is a paradigmatic "miscarriage of justice." And, 
further, this improper assignment of judgment led to sequelae which are 
anathema to public policy, such as denial of costs to the victims for 
successfully proving a Fair Housing Act violation. 
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issue, though later they conceded the point, it bears 
mentioning that beyond a doubt, punitive damages can be 
awarded in a civil rights case where a jury finds a 
constitutional violation, even when the jury has not 
awarded compensatory or nominal damages. See Curtis v. 
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (punitive damages appropriate 
for Title VIII violation without award for actual loss, 
remanding for jury trial on punitive damages amount), see 
also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 
1965)(punitive damages appropriate in section 1983 case 
absent award of compensatory damages). 
 
We have sufficiently resolved this matter in our foregoing 
discussion on the jury charge regarding liability, and in our 
conclusion that a Fair Housing Act violation is all that is 
needed to establish liability. Another reason the District 
Court declined to send the issue of punitive damages to the 
jury is that the District Court concluded that the jury 
apparently did not believe Mrs. Riga's conduct to have 
resulted from the type of evil motive thought necessary to 
award punitive damages. We will address this second point. 
 
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a punitive 
damages award is a question of law which we review de 
novo. Delli Santi v. CNA Ins., 88 F.3d 192, 207 (3d Cir. 
1996), Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem., 752 F.2d 
802, 814-15 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 
(1986). 
 
Here, there is a specific damages provision in the plain 
language of the statute. 42 U.S.C. S3613(c) provides the 
relief which may be granted, when, as here, private 
individuals seek to enforce the Fair Housing Act: 
 
       (1) In a civil action under subsection (a) of this  section, 
       if the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice 
       has occurred . . . , the court may award to the plaintiff 
       actual and punitive damages, and . . . may grant as 
       relief, as the court deems appropriate, any permanent 
       or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, 
       or other order (including an order enjoining the 
       defendant from engaging in such practice or ordering 
       such affirmative action as may be appropriate). 
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       (2) In a civil action under subsection (a) of this  section, 
       the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 
       party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
       attorney's fee and costs. 
 
       *  *  * 
 
The District Court has the duty to "give effect, if possible, 
to every clause and word of [the] statute." Bennett v. Spear, 
520 U.S. 54 (1997). 
 
The standard for punitive damages in a federal civil rights 
action was set by the Supreme Court, and does not require 
"outrageousness": a jury may "assess punitive damages in 
[a civil rights action] when the defendant's conduct is 
shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it 
involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally 
protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade , 461 U.S. 30, 56 
(1983). 
 
In denying the Alexanders' request to submit the punitive 
damages issue to the jury, the District Court found that 
punitive damages were precluded because the jury's refusal 
to award damages showed that the jury, in the District 
Court's words, "did not consider the conduct of Mrs. Riga 
to have been the result of an evil motive or intent or to have 
involved reckless or callous indifference to the federally 
protected rights of others." In the District Court's view, it 
thus "would be inappropriate to permit the jury to award 
punitive damages to them." The District Court also held 
that more than intentional discrimination is required for 
the jury to enter punitive damages -- that "outrageous 
conduct on the part of Mrs. Riga beyond that which may 
attach to any finding of intentional discrimination" was 
required. 
 
"Malice" and "reckless indifference," in this context, 
however, refer not to the egregiousness of the landlord's 
conduct, but rather to the landlord's knowledge that it may 
be acting in violation of federal law. See Kolstad v. American 
Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526, ___, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 2124 
(1999). In Kolstad, a female employee sued her employer 
under Title VII, asserting that the employer's decision to 
promote a male employee over her was a proscribed act of 
gender discrimination. The District Court denied the 
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employee's request for a jury instruction on punitive 
damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, 
before the jury can be instructed on punitive damages, the 
evidence must demonstrate that the defendant has engaged 
in some "egregious" misconduct; under the facts of that 
case, the female employee had failed to make the requisite 
showing. The Supreme Court vacated the earlier decision 
and remanded. In so doing, the Supreme Court explicitly 
rejected the conclusion that "eligibility for punitive damages 
can only be described in terms of [a defendant's] `egregious' 
misconduct." Rather, the Supreme Court held that"[t]he 
terms `malice' and `reckless' ultimately focus on the actor's 
state of mind," making a showing of egregious or 
outrageous discrimination unnecessary. Id. Applied to the 
case before us, we hold that because the jury'sfinding of a 
violation under the Fair Housing Act necessarily 
encompasses a finding of intentional discrimination, the 
plaintiffs need not also demonstrate that the conduct was 
particularly egregious or malicious in order to obtain 
punitive damages. 
 
Indeed, recklessness and malice may be inferred when a 
manager responsible for showing and renting apartments 
repeatedly refuses to deal with African-Americans about the 
apartment, and misrepresents the apartment's availability. 
See Miller v. Apartments & Homes, 646 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 
1981) ( punitive damages appropriate where defendant acts 
with reckless disregard as to whether he is violating a 
federally protected right, or consciously and deliberately 
disregards consequences of actions), see also Woods-Drake 
v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982) ("wilful and gross" 
violation of the Fair Housing Act supported punitive 
damages where landlord evicted tenants for having African- 
American guests; on remand, trial court directed to assess 
punitive damages). 
 
In the case before us, the jury returned special verdicts 
finding the rights of the Alexanders and the FHP testers 
under the Fair Housing Act to have been violated. The 
Alexanders and the FHP presented evidence that Mrs. Riga 
persistently refused to deal with African-Americans, as 
opposed to whites, and represented that an apartment was 
not available for inspection or rental, when it was. The 
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Alexanders described in saddening detail the deceptions to 
which they were subjected, and the consequent 
mortification they suffered. Mrs. Riga told them that "they 
had just missed" the apartment listed in an advertisement 
on Sunday, the day before. When the same advertisement 
appeared the following Sunday, Mr. Alexander asked a 
friend to call. The friend was told that the apartment was 
available. Using a different name, Mr. Alexander arranged 
to see the apartment and called twice to confirm the 
appointment. When he met Mrs. Riga at the building, she 
falsely stated that she had forgotten her keys, and could 
not show him the apartment, as her hand covered up her 
keys. Mr. Alexander "couldn't believe it, it made him angry," 
he thought she was lying. When he asked to reschedule, 
Mrs. Riga said that he could call her. He was feeling "a little 
bit too sick to say anything else . . . ." He walked away, 
then turned and saw her entering the building. He called to 
reschedule and left messages, but did not receive a 
responding telephone call from Mrs. Riga. After this, Mr. 
Alexander sought the assistance of the FHP, which directed 
testers to seek the apartment. In short, the white testers 
were granted access while the African-Americans testers 
were denied access. Mr. Alexander continued to try to 
contact Mrs. Riga and also had friends call. To one friend 
he remarked that he felt "hurt and discouraged, it is sort of 
degrading, it discourages you from trying . . . tofind a place 
for your family to live, it is just sickening, I really can't 
describe it. It is terrible . . . ." 
 
The Supreme Court in Kolstad did observe that the mere 
existence of a civil rights violation is not a guarantee of 
eligibility for punitive damages because a defendant might 
not be aware of the federal law he or she violated or he or 
she might have honestly believed that the discrimination 
was permissible. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2125. These 
exceptions, however, do not apply to the Rigas in this case. 
Here, there is not any suggestion that Mrs. Riga did not 
know that it was illegal, and had been for thirty years, to 
discriminate on the basis of race in housing. The jury 
concluded that Mrs. Riga refused to deal with African- 
Americans with respect to the apartment building and was 
motivated by race. The plaintiffs have adduced sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate "reckless or callous indifference" to 
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federally protected rights and to permit the jury to award 
punitive damages. 
 
2. Mr. Riga's Liability for Punitive Damages 
 
Although both Mr. and Mrs. Riga were defendants at 
trial, the special verdicts that were submitted to the jury 
were limited to determining Mrs. Riga's liability for 
discriminatory conduct. The District Court concluded that 
only Mrs. Riga was involved in the events leading to this 
lawsuit because Mr. Riga was in Italy at all relevant times. 
The Rigas assert that excluding Mr. Riga from the punitive 
damages discussion was appropriate because he neither 
had the requisite personal involvement nor did he 
acquiesce in Mrs. Riga's discriminatory conduct. The 
plaintiffs argue that both Mr. and Mrs. Riga should be 
subject to punitive damages, because, though Mr. Riga was 
out of the country at the relevant time, he violated a 
nondelegable duty not to discriminate under the Fair 
Housing Act. 
 
Of course, a principal is directly liable where he himself 
commits, authorizes, or ratifies discriminatory treatment, 
see Miller, 646 F.2d at 111 ($25,000 punitive damages 
award against principal for agent's action, where principal 
was involved in wrongdoing or authorized, ratified, or 
fostered agent's discriminatory acts); see also Asbury v. 
Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir. 1989) (owner of 
management company and agent who refused to rent both 
liable; punitive damages against owner sustained). We now 
must decide, as a matter of first impression, whether a 
principal is vicariously liable for punitive damages for 
violations of the Fair Housing Act by the discriminatory 
acts of his managerial agent. 
 
The Rigas contend that Mrs. Riga's conduct cannot be 
attributed to Mr. Riga. They are mistaken. Mr. Riga could 
not insulate himself from liability for discrimination in 
regard to an apartment building owned jointly by him and 
his wife and managed for their joint benefit, merely by 
relinquishing the responsibility for preventing 
discrimination to Mrs. Riga, his managerial agent. To 
effectuate the Fair Housing Act's mandate, both Mr. and 
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Mrs. Riga are held responsible for Mrs. Riga's 
discriminatory practices. Here we adopt the general rule 
applied by other federal courts that the duty of a landlord 
under the Fair Housing Act not to discriminate in the 
leasing of property may not be delegated to the landlord's 
employee. Civil Rights Act of 1968, S801 et seq., 42 U.S.C. 
S3601 et seq. See Walker v. Crigler, 976 F.2d 900, 904 & n. 
5 (4th Cir. 1992)("the duty of a property owner not to 
discriminate in the leasing or sale of that property is non- 
delegable"), see also Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 741 (6th 
Cir. 1974) ("The discriminatory conduct of an apartment 
manager or rental agent is, as a general rule, attributable 
to the owner and property manager of the apartment 
complex, both under the doctrine of respondeat superior 
and because the duty to obey the law is non-delegable."), 
Coates v. Bechtel, 811 F.2d 1045, 1051 (7th Cir. 1987); 
Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, 648 F.2d 548, 552 (9th 
Cir. 1980); Saunders v. General Services, 659 F.Supp. 
1042, 1059 (E.D.Va. 1987) ("Under the Fair Housing Act, a 
corporation and its officers `are responsible for the acts of 
a subordinate employee . . . even though these acts were 
neither directed nor authorized . . . .' Courts have followed 
this rule even where `it seems harsh to punish innocent 
and well-intentioned employers' because the statutory duty 
not to discriminate is non-delegable") (citations omitted). 
 
On policy grounds, in Kolstad the Supreme Court 
arguably modified one aspect of this general rule, which 
could produce the harsh result that even a landlord who 
had made every effort to prevent discrimination could 
nevertheless be subject to punitive damages. Kolstad, 119 
S. Ct. at 2128. Cf. Walker, 976 F.2d at 904-905 (property 
owner liable for the conduct of employees despite 
instructions to them not to discriminate). Recognizing civil 
rights law as an effort to promote prevention as well as 
remediation and observing the principles underlying the 
Restatement's limits on vicarious liability for punitive 
damages,9 the Supreme Court held that, "in the punitive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Restatement (Second) of Agency, among other things, authorizes 
punitive damages "against a . . . principal because of an [agent's] act . 
. 
. 
if . . . the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting 
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damages context, an employer could not be vicariously 
liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of 
managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the 
employer's `good-faith efforts to comply with[civil rights 
laws].' " Kolstad, 119 S.Ct. at 2118, 2121, 2128. The 
Supreme Court continued that "[g]iving punitive damages 
protection to employers who make good-faith efforts to 
prevent discrimination . . . accomplishes [the civil rights 
laws'] objective of `motivat[ing] employers to detect and 
deter [civil rights] violations.' " Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the issue of Mr. Riga's 
liability should be submitted to the jury. While Mr. Riga 
may have been abroad at the time of the suit, he apparently 
left Mrs. Riga in charge of the apartment building with 
authority to act on behalf of the two of them as a couple. 
At this juncture, we do not know if Mr. Riga made"good 
faith efforts to prevent discrimination," defined to an extent 
by the Supreme Court as efforts to "deter and detect [civil 
rights] violations" and to "enforce an anti-discrimination 
policy." Id. at 2129-2130. We leave to the jury on remand 
to determine whether Mr. Riga engaged in active anti- 
discrimination efforts sufficient to protect him from the 
impact of the general rule that he may not delegate to Mrs. 
Riga the duty not to discriminate. 
 
D. Injunctive Relief 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs also argue that because the jury 
returned special verdicts finding that Mrs. Riga had violated 
the Fair Housing Act through a continuing course of refusal 
to deal with African-Americans, the District Court should 
have granted injunctive relief, not only to safeguard the 
rights of these plaintiffs, but also on a policy level to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
in the scope of employment," and affirms that even intentional, 
specifically forbidden torts are within this scope if the conduct is "the 
kind [the employee] is employed to perform," "occurs substantially within 
the authorized time and space limits," and "is actuated, at least in part, 
by a purpose to serve" the employer. Restatement (Second) of Agency 
SS217 C(c), 228(1), 230, cmt. b. (1958). 
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safeguard free access to housing. The District Court denied 
the plaintiffs' request to present evidence on the need for 
injunctive relief, asserting that the plaintiffs had waived the 
request, because, although it had been a significant portion 
of the complaint and pretrial statement, the plaintiffs had 
not repeated the request until six days after the jury trial. 
The District Court also found that even had the plaintiffs 
not waived the request, there was no need for injunctive 
relief because there was not any evidence of a continuing or 
recurrent violation. 
 
The Rigas suggest that the plaintiffs sought injunctive 
relief primarily to allow them to recover their attorneys' 
fees, but stated the issue as, "whether [within the court's 
discretion] declaratory and injunctive relief is necessary." Of 
course, the Rigas assert that this Court should defer to the 
District Court's judgment that it was unnecessary; evidence 
had been presented that the Rigas had rented apartments 
to African-Americans since the events of the Alexanders' 
lawsuit. Were we to examine the issue of injunctive relief on 
the merits, we would accord the District Court substantial 
deference on this matter, under the applicable abuse of 
discretion standard. Marco v. Accent Publ'g, 969 F.2d 1547, 
1548 (3d Cir. 1992) (denial of injunctive relief reviewed for 
abuse of discretion, which occurs if the District Court's 
decision rests on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
error of law, or a misapplication of law to the facts). This 
deference is not absolute, however, and we would need to 
be mindful that deterrence and prevention of future 
discrimination, one of the central purposes of the civil 
rights statutes, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358, might require 
the entry of injunctive relief. We are troubled to an extent 
by the District Court's rationale, which might permit the 
Rigas and other civil rights defendants to discriminate and 
stop when caught, in enough time to "obviate" the need for 
a court to issue injunctive relief. 
 
Regardless of the interesting nature of this issue, 
however, we will hold, as did the District Court, that the 
issue has been waived. Here, six days elapsed from the time 
the jury's verdicts were returned and the jury was 
discharged, until the plaintiffs requested a hearing on 
injunctive relief. Though the District Court conceded that 
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the plaintiffs had requested this relief in their complaint 
and pretrial statements, "at no time during the pretrial 
conferences with the court, or during the trial itself, did 
plaintiffs' attorneys refer to their requests for injunctive and 
equitable relief." We agree with the District Court that the 
issue is waived by the failure of counsel to raise the issue 
of injunctive relief prior to the conclusion of trial. In 
addition, through the remand we direct in this opinion, we 
are satisfied that, to some extent, the policy goal of 
deterring future discrimination will be effected. 
 
E. Evidentiary Matters 
 
In light of our decision, the remainder of the issues 
raised by both parties are either mooted or left to 
reconsideration on the limited remand we now grant. We 
comment here only briefly on two remaining evidentiary 
matters: (1) the plaintiffs' claim that the District Court 
abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the Rigas' 
discrimination against other African-Americans, and (2) the 
Rigas' claim on cross-appeal that the District Court abused 
its discretion by excluding evidence of the Alexanders' lack 
of creditworthiness and lack of credibility. Wefind that in 
neither instance did the District Court abuse its discretion. 
 
The plaintiffs maintain that the District Court erred in 
excluding probative evidence of the Rigas' ongoing pattern 
of discrimination in the form of an eyewitness, Steven 
Denson, who allegedly observed Mrs. Riga discriminating 
against other African-American applicants. The plaintiffs 
state that the witness' address was only discovered during 
the trial, because the Rigas' counsel had refused to supply 
it upon request. Further, the plaintiffs assert that were this 
evidence permitted, the Rigas would suffer no surprise or 
prejudice, inasmuch as their counsel had interviewed the 
witness previously. 
 
For their part, the Rigas dispute that they acted 
improperly with respect to this witness. The evidence's 
relevance was tenuous -- he might not even have been at 
the Darlington building. The District Court reasonably 
concluded that the probative value of the testimony was 
outweighed by its prejudicial impact. 
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Similarly, properly excluded was the evidence the Rigas 
proffered that the Alexanders were not creditworthy. 
Though the Rigas maintain that the Alexanders had to 
show that they were fully qualified to rent the apartment 
ultimately, the Alexanders only needed to show that they 
were qualified to be applicants, to view the apartment, and 
be treated no differently from other applicants. If this case 
were about the Alexanders' unsuccessful apartment 
application and they could make a prima facie showing of 
discrimination, then the evidence of creditworthiness would 
indeed be relevant. Under the facts with which we are 
presented, however, the evidence was not relevant, and the 
District Court properly excluded it. Finally, the Rigas claim 
that they should have been permitted to offer evidence of 
the Alexanders' untruthful statements on documents such 
as employment applications. The Rigas obviously sought to 
introduce this evidence to show conformity therewith. The 
District Court properly excluded this too, because it was 
evidence of other bad acts not admissible to prove the 
Alexanders' character under Fed. R. Evid. 404 and not 
within the exceptions outlined in Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 
 
IV. 
 
We will reverse the decision of the District Court granting 
judgment to the Rigas as against the Alexanders and the 
decision declining to submit the question of punitive 
damages to the jury. We direct the District Court to enter 
judgment for the Alexanders, and for other declaratory 
relief consistent with our opinion, as well as costs, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, to the Alexanders and 
the FHP and to remand the case for a new trial solely to 
present to a jury the question of punitive damages as 
against both Mr. and Mrs. Riga. 
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